Compiler correctness is, in its simplest form, defined as the inclusion of the set of traces of the compiled program into the set of traces of the original program, which is equivalent to the preservation of all trace properties. Here traces collect, for instance, the externally observable events of each execution. This definition requires, however, the set of traces of the source and target languages to be exactly the same, which is not the case when the languages are far apart or when observations are fine grained. To overcome this issue, we study a generalized compiler correctness definition, which uses source and target traces drawn from potentially different sets and connected by an arbitrary relation. We set out to understand what guarantees this generalized compiler correctness definition gives us when instantiated with a non-trivial relation on traces. When this trace relation is not equality, it is no longer possible to preserve the trace properties of the source program unchanged. Instead, we provide a generic characterization of the target trace property ensured by correctly compiling a program that satisfies a given source property, and dually, of the source trace property one is required to show in order to obtain a certain target property for the compiled code. We show that this view on compiler correctness can naturally account for undefined behavior, resource exhaustion, different source and target values, side-channels, and various abstraction mismatches. Finally, we show that the same generalization also applies to a large class of secure compilation definitions, which characterize the protection of a compiled program against linked adversarial code.
INTRODUCTION
Compiler correctness is an old idea [28, 30, 31] that has seen a significant revival in the recent past. This new wave was started by the creation of the CompCert verified C compiler [25] and continued by the proposal of many significant extensions and variants of CompCert [7, 13, 21, 22, 32, 42, 47, 49, 53] and the success of many other milestone compiler verification projects, including Vellvm [54] , Pilsner [33] , CakeML [50] , Jasmin [5] , CertiCoq [6] , etc. Yet, even for these verified compilers, the precise statement of correctness matters. Since proof assistants are used to conduct the verification, an external observer does not have to understand the proofs in order to trust them, but one still has to deeply understand the statement that was proved. And this is true not just for correct compilation, but also for secure compilation, which is the more recent idea that our compilation chains should do more to also ensure the security of our programs [4, 16] .
Basic Compiler Correctness. The gold standard for compiler correctness is semantic preservation, which intuitively says that the semantics of a compiled program (in the target language) is compatible with the semantics of the original program (in the source language). For practical verified compilers, such as CompCert [25] and CakeML [50] , semantic preservation is stated extrinsically, by referring to traces. A trace is an ordered sequence of events-such as inputs from and outputs to an external environment-that are produced by the execution of a program.
A basic definition of compiler correctness can be given by the set inclusion of the traces of the compiled program into the traces of the original program, which can be formally written as [25] :
The resulting CC ∼ instance relates a target trace ending with Resource_limit_hit after executing m to a source trace that first produces m and then continues in a way given by the semantics of the source program. Beyond undefined behavior and resource exhaustion, there are many other practical uses for CC ∼ : in this paper we show that it also allows for accounting differences between source and target values, for a single source output being turned into a series of target outputs, and for side-channels.
On the flip side, the compiler correctness statement and its implications can be more difficult to understand for CC ∼ than for CC = . The full implications of choosing a particular ∼ relation can be subtle. In fact, using a bad relation can make the compiler correctness statement trivial or unexpected. For instance, it should be easy to see that if one uses the full relation, which relates all source traces to all target ones, the CC ∼ property holds for every compiler, yet it might take one a bit more effort to understand that the same is true even for the following relation: s ∼ t ⇐⇒ ∃W.W⇝ ⇝ ⇝s ∧ W↓⇝ ⇝ ⇝t
Reasoning About Trace Properties. To understand more about a particular CC ∼ instance, we propose to also look at how it preserves trace properties-defined as sets of allowed traces [23] -from the source to the target. For instance, it is well-known that CC = is equivalent to the preservation of all trace properties (where W |= π stands for ∀t . W ⇝ ⇝ ⇝t ⇒ t ∈ π ):
But to the best of our knowledge, similar results have not been formulated for trace relations beyond equality, when it is no longer possible to preserve the trace properties of the source program unchanged. For trace-relating compiler correctness, where source and target traces can be drawn from different sets, and related by an arbitrary trace relation, there are two important questions to ask:
(1) Given a source trace property π S of a program-established for instance by formal verificationwhat is the strongest target property that any CC ∼ compiler is guaranteed to ensure for the produced target program? (2) Given a target trace property π T , what is the weakest source property we need to show of the original source program for obtaining π T for the result of any CC ∼ compiler? In this work we provide a simple and general answer to these questions, for any instance of CC ∼ . We observe that any trace relation ∼ induces two property mappingsτ andσ , which are simple functions mapping source properties to target ones (τ standing for "to target") and target properties to source ones (σ standing for "to source"):
τ (π S ) = {t | ∃s. s ∼ t ∧ s ∈ π S }σ (π T ) = {s | ∀t. s ∼ t ⇒ t ∈ π T } τ answers the first question above by mapping a given source property π S to the target property that contains all target traces for which there exists a related source trace that satisfies π S . Dually,σ answers the second question by mapping a given target property π T to the source property that contains all source traces for which all related target traces satisfy π T . Formally, we show thatτ andσ form a Galois connection and introduce two new correct compilation definitions in terms of trace property preservation (TP): TPτ quantifies over all source trace properties and usesτ to obtain the corresponding target properties. TPσ quantifies over all target trace properties and usesσ to obtain the corresponding source properties. We prove that these two definitions are equivalent to CC ∼ , yielding a novel trinitarian view of compiler correctness, illustrated in Figure 1 . Contributions ▶ We propose a new trinitarian view of compiler correctness that accounts for a non-trivial relation between source and target traces. While, as discussed above, specific instances of the CC ∼ definition have already been used in practice, we seem to be the first to propose assessing the meaningfulness of CC ∼ instances in terms of how properties are preserved between the source and the target, and in particular by looking at the property mappingsσ andτ induced by the trace relation ∼. We prove that CC ∼ , TPσ , and TPτ are equivalent for any trace relation, as illustrated in Figure 1 ( §2.3). In the opposite direction, we show that any property mappings that form a Galois connection induce a trace relation so that an analogous equivalence holds ( §2.4). Finally, we extend these results from the preservation of trace properties to the larger class of subset-closed hyperproperties ( §2.5), which includes for instance noninterference. ▶ We use example CC ∼ compilers of different complexity to illustrate that this view on compiler correctness can naturally account for undefined behavior ( §3.1), for resource exhaustion ( §3.2), for different source and target values ( §3.3), for a single source output being turned into a series of target outputs ( §3.4), and for target traces that contain extra side-channel observations that could leak secret information ( §3.5). We expect these ideas to apply to any other discrepancies between source and target traces. For each example compiler we show how to choose the relation between source and target traces and how the induced property mappings preserve interesting trace properties and subset-closed hyperproperties. We look not only at general hyperproperty classes, such as safety and abstract noninterference, but also at individual properties, and the way particularσ andτ work on different kinds of properties and how the produced property can be expressed for different kinds of traces. ▶ We apply the idea of mapping between source and target properties to two other property classes ( §4). One the one hand, one can weaken compiler correctness to preserving just the safety properties of the source or of the target language. On the other hand, one can strengthen compiler correctness to preserving arbitrary hyperproperties, even ones that are not subset closed, which prevents refinement of nondeterminism.
▶ Finally, we show that the trinitarian view also extends to a large class of secure compilation definitions, formally characterizing the protection of the compiled program against linked adversarial code ( §5). For each secure compilation definition we again propose both a propertyfree characterization in the style of CC ∼ , and two characterizations in terms of preserving a class of source or target properties satisfied against arbitrary adversarial contexts. The additional quantification over contexts allows for finer distinctions when considering different property classes, so we study mapping classes not only of trace properties and hyperproperties, but also of relational hyperproperties [2] . An example secure compiler accounting for a target that can produce additional observations that are not possible in the source illustrates this approach. The paper closes with discussions of related ( §6) and future work ( §7). The appendix contains a few omitted technical details. Most of the theorems formally or informally mentioned in the paper were also mechanized in the Coq proof assistant and are marked with ; this development has around 10k lines of code and is available https://github.com/secure-compilation/ exploring-robust-property-preservation/tree/different_traces
TRACE-RELATING COMPILER CORRECTNESS
In this section, we start by generalizing the trace property preservation definitions from the end of the introduction to TP σ and TP τ , which depend on two arbitrary mappings σ and τ ( §2.1). We prove that whenever σ and τ form a Galois connection TP σ and TP τ are equivalent ( §2.2). Sincẽ σ andτ form a Galois connection, we use the general result above to show that TPσ and TPτ are equivalent, which we then use to prove that any relation ∼ inducesσ andτ that makes the trinitarian equivalence of Figure 1 hold ( §2.3). This helps us assess the meaningfulness of a given trace relation, by looking at the property mappings it induces. We also prove a dual result: for any σ and τ forming a Galois connection we can define a trace relation so that the trinitarian equivalence holds ( §2.4). This allows us to obtain the right trace relation if we want to ensure some particular property mappings. Finally, we generalize the classic result that compiler correctness (e.g., CC = ) is enough to preserve not just trace properties but also all subset-closed hyperproperties [9] . For this we show that CC ∼ is also equivalent to subset-closed hyperproperty preservation, for which we also define both a version in terms ofσ and a version in terms ofτ ( §2.5).
Property Mappings
As mentioned in the introduction, trace-relating compiler correctness CC ∼ , by itself, lacks a crisp description of which trace properties are preserved by compilation. Since even the syntax of traces can differ between source and target one can either look at trace properties of the source, but then one needs to interpret them in the target, or at trace properties of the target, but then one needs to interpret them in the source. The first interpretation could answer the following question: What guarantees does one obtain when compiling a verified C program that does not encounter an undefined behavior to machine code ( §3.1)? The second interpretation could tell us what condition in the source prevents a compiled program from failing with an out of memory violation ( §3.2). Formally, these two interpretations can be seen as two property mappings:
For an arbitrary source program W, τ interprets a source property π S as the target guarantee for W↓. Dually, σ defines a source obligation sufficient for the satisfaction of a target property π T after compilation. To stay coherent with this informal interpretation, some extra conditions on τ and σ seem natural (and as we will see in §2.2, also formally useful):
• First, the source property obtained by applying σ to the guarantee obtained by interpreting π S in the target (via τ ), should be weaker than π S itself, i.e. σ (τ (π S )) ⊇ π S .
• Dually, the target property obtained via τ from the source obligation (via σ ) for a target property π T , should actually ensure that π T holds, i.e. τ (σ (π T )) ⊆ π T . These two conditions on τ and σ are satisfied exactly when the two maps form a Galois connection between the posets of source and target properties ordered by inclusion.
Let us first recall the definition and the characteristic property of Galois connections [11, 29] .
Definition 2.1 (Galois connection). Let (X , ≤) and (Y , ⊑) be two posets. A pair of maps, α : X → Y , γ : Y → X is a Galois connection iff it satisfies the following adjunction law:
α is referred to as the lower adjoint and γ as the upper adjoint. We will often write
to denote a Galois connection, and simply α : X ⇆ Y : γ when X and Y are powersets and the considered order is set inclusion, and even α ⇆ γ when the involved sets are clear from context.
Lemma 2.2 (Characteristic property of Galois connections). If
γ is a Galois connection, then α, γ are monotone and they satisfy the following properties:
The two characteristic properties of Galois connections coincide with the conditions on property mappings introduced above, taking X to be source properties, Y to be target properties, α to be τ , γ to be and σ , and the order to be set inclusion; i.e. σ (τ (π S )) ⊇ π S and τ (σ (π T )) ⊆ π T .
Perhaps surprisingly, the property mapping to the target (τ ) corresponds to the abstraction function α, while the property mapping to the source (σ ) corresponds to the concretization function γ . The explanation is that the definition of trace properties 2 Trace is contravariant in Trace, so while traces get more concrete when moving to the target, trace properties get, well, more abstract.
Revisiting Trace Properties Preservation
We can now generalize trace properties preservation (TP), relying on an interpretation of source properties in the target and target ones in the source. Definition 2.3 (TP σ and TP τ ). Given two trace property mappings, τ : 2 Trace S → 2 Trace T and σ : 2 Trace T → 2 Trace S , for a compilation chain ·↓ we define:
Note that, by uniqueness of adjoints [29] , given a τ , there exists a unique σ such that they form a Galois connection (and vice-versa). Here, this means that if one is designing a compiler whose correctness goal is to ensure preservation of source properties according to a given mapping τ , then there is a unique corresponding property mapping σ from target properties to source properties (and vice-versa). This suggests that, for any two property mappings defining a Galois connection, TP τ and TP τ are equivalent.
Theorem 2.4 (TP τ and TP σ coincide). Let τ : 2 Trace S ⇄ 2 Trace T : σ be a Galois connection, where τ is the lower adjoint and σ is the upper adjoint. Then TP τ ⇐⇒ TP σ .
Proof. ( ) See Corollary Adj_σ TP_iff_τ TP in NonRobustDefs.v. In general, if a program satisfies a property π , then it satisfies every extension π ′ ⊇ π . Using this, the theorem follows by: (⇒) Assume TP τ and that W satisfies σ (π T ). Apply TP τ to W and σ (π T ) and deduce that W↓
We now investigate the relation between CC ∼ and TP τ and TP σ . In §2.3, we show that starting from a given trace relation ∼, it is always possible to define two property mappingsτ ,σ so that the three criteria are all equivalent (Theorem 2.7). In §2.4 we show that, dually, given a Galois connection τ ⇄ σ it is possible to define a relation that still ensures the equivalence (Theorem 2.10).
From Trace Relations to Property Mappings
Definition 2.5 (Induced property mappings). Given an arbitrary trace relation ∼ ⊆ Trace S ×Trace T , we define its induced property mappingsτ andσ as explained in the introduction:
These induced property mappings indeed form a Galois connection. It follows that, for a CC ∼ compiler,σ provides the source proof obligation ensuring a certain target property holds, andτ provides the target guarantee of a compiled program every time a property holds for the source program. Note that, as we will see with concrete instances in §3, in some specific settings the lifted properties may be simply impossible to satisfy.
From Property Mappings to Trace Relations
A compiler designer might start by first determining the target guarantees (τ ), and then aim at showing TP τ , which can, however, be challenging to prove directly. This section shows that, given a Galois connection between source and target properties, we can define a trace relation ∼ that ensures the equivalence between CC ∼ , TP τ , and TP σ . Consequently, instead of proving TP τ directly, it is sufficient to prove CC ∼ , for which convenient proof techniques exist in the literature [25] .
Definition 2.8 (Induced trace relation (∼)). Given a Galois connection τ : 2 Trace S ⇆ 2 Trace T : σ , we define the induced trace relation∼ ⊆ Trace S × Trace T so that the target guarantee for π S , τ (π S ) coincides with the image of the relation on the same π S .
Notice that σ does not appear in the definition, but it is uniquely defined by being the upper adjoint of τ [29] , so∼ depends on both τ and σ .
Lemma 2.9 (Involutive lemma ). Let τ : 2 Trace S ⇆ 2 Trace T : σ be a Galois connection and let∼ be their induced trace relation (Definition 2.8). Letτ : 2 Trace S ⇆ 2 Trace T :σ be the Galois connection induced by∼ (Definition 2.5), then the two Galois connections coincide:
Proof. The proof mainly relies on continuity of τ (see Lemma 2.2). In particular for π S ∈ 2 Trace S we have τ (π S ) = s∈π S τ ({s}). So that for an arbitrary π S ∈ 2 Trace S ,
(ii) is an immediate consequence of the (well-known) uniqueness of the upper adjoint [29] . □ Theorem 2.10 (TP τ , CC∼, and TP σ all coincide). Given a Galois connection τ ⇄ σ between
property mappings, and their induced trace relation∼ (Definition 2.8), we have:
Proof. By Lemma 2.9, τ and σ coincide pointwise with the upper and lower adjoint induced by the relation∼. The result then follows by Theorem 2.7. □
Preservation of Subset-Closed Hyperproperties
A CC = compilation chain ensures the preservation of not only trace properties but also all subsetclosed hyperproperties, as this class of hyperproperties is known to be preserved by refinement [9] . An example of a subset-closed hyperproperty is noninterference [9] , and a CC = compiler guarantees that if W is noninterfering with respect to the inputs and outputs in the trace then so is W↓. We will go back to noninterference for the trace-changing setting in §3.5; but to be able to talk about properties such as noninterference here we propose another trinitarian view involving CC ∼ and preservation of subset-closed hyperproperties (Theorem 2.13). First of all recall that a program satisfies a hyperproperty when its complete set of traces, which from now on we will call its behavior, is a member of the hyperproperty [9] . Hyperproperty preservation is a strong requirement in general. Fortunately many interesting hyperproperties are subset-closed (SCH for short), which simplifies preservation of such hyperproperties, since it suffices to show that the behaviors of the compiled program refine the behaviors of the source one, which coincides with the statement of CC = .
In the trace-relating setting, to talk about hyperproperty preservation, we need an interpretation of source hyperproperties into the target and vice-versa. The one we consider builds on top of the two property mappings τ and σ , which are naturally lifted to hyperproperty mappings. This way we are able to extract two hyperproperty mappings from a trace relation similarly to §2.3. Definition 2.12 (Lifting property mappings to hyperproperty mappings). Let τ : 2 Trace S → 2 Trace T and σ : 2 Trace T → 2 Trace S be arbitrary property mappings. The images of H S ∈ 2 2 Trace S , H T ∈ 2 2 Trace T under τ and σ respectively are:
Formally we are defining two new mappings, on hyperproperties, but with a small abuse of notation we still denote them by τ and σ . Interestingly, it is not possible to use the same argument used for CC = to show that a CC ∼ compilation chain guarantees W↓ |=τ (H S ) whenever W |= H S . The proof breaks as the target hyperpropertyτ (H S ) is not necessarily subset-closed, even if the original hyperproperty H S was.
In the following theorem we consider the loss of precision, due to the two interpretations of hyperproperties, and closeτ (H S ) under subsets (and similarly forσ ).
Theorem 2.13 (Preservation of Subset-Closed Hyperproperties). For any trace relation ∼ and induced hyperproperty mappingsτ andσ , we have:
In conclusion, CC ∼ can also be used to reason about the preservation of subset-closed hyperproperties, but one has to be aware of the potential loss of precision introduced by the subset closure. We illustrate this in §3.5 when considering the preservation of noninterference in a CC ∼ compiler to a target language with additional low-level observations.
INSTANCES OF TRACE-RELATING COMPILER CORRECTNESS
The trace-relating view of compiler correctness introduced in §2 can function as a unifying framework and studying a range of interesting and realistic compilers. This section provides several representative instantiations of the framework: source languages with undefined behavior that can turn by compilation into arbitrary behavior ( §3.1), target languages with resource exhaustion that cannot happen in the source ( §3.2), changes in the representation of values ( §3.3), differences in the granularity of data and observable events ( §3.4), and increased observational power of physical resources such as time in the target and its effects on noninterference ( §3.5).
Undefined Behavior
In this section, we expand upon the discussion of undefined behavior from §1.
Old unsafe source languages, such as C and C++, focus so much on performance that they admit so called undefined behavior: for historical reasons and since providing a sane behavior for all programs would be too expensive (e.g., would require checking bounds on arrays), parts of the semantics of these languages are left unspecified. As explained previously, programs exhibiting any such behavior have no semantics according to the standards. Hence, one standard-compliant option is to discard these programs as "unsafe", and say that compiler correctness only applies to "safe" programs [25] . However, this is unsatisfying: many real-world programs have undefined behavior, which often leads to exploitable security vulnerabilities. A slightly saner view of undefined behavior is to see it as an event that happens during execution. After it happens, the compiled program is allowed to behave in a completely arbitrary manner, but until that happens the program still receives compiler correctness guarantees.
One of CompCert's correctness theorem states exactly this (in file driver/Complements.v):
Every behavior of the generated assembly code is matched by a behavior of the source C code. The behavior beh of the assembly code is either identical to the behavior beh' of the source C code or "improves upon" beh' by replacing a "going wrong" behavior with a more defined behavior.
In the following, we describe how we can capture such a theorem in our framework. We consider two variants: in the first one (Example 3.1), we stick to CompCert, where the source and target alphabets are the same, including the undefined behavior event. In this case, the relation allows relaxing equality by potentially replacing undefined behavior with any sequence of events. In the second case (Example 3.2), we observe that, at levels low enough, such as machine code, the language often has no undefined behavior. However, at such levels, machine instructions that are never used by the compiler can produce new events that are not modeled in the source.
Example 3.1 (CompCert's Relation). Source and target traces are sequences of events drawn from Σ, where Goes_wronд ∈ Σ. The symbol Goes_wronд is a terminal event that represents an undefined behavior. We recall the trace relation for undefined behavior from the introduction:
This captures the intuition above in the following way: a compiler satisfying CC ∼ produces compiled programs for which each trace can be explained in one of the two following ways:
• it can also be produced by the source program; or • there exists a finite prefix of this trace that is produced by the source program, immediately followed by an undefined behavior. CompCert is verified to satisfy this variant of CC ∼ .
Trace properties. We proved that the two property mappings induced by the relation can be written as follows ( , file UndefBehaviorCompCert.v):
These two mappings explain what a CC ∼ compiler ensures for the ∼ relation above:
• The target-to-source mappingσ states that to prove that a compiled program has a property π T using source-level reasoning, one has to prove that any trace produced by the source program must either be a target trace satisfying π T or have undefined behavior provided that any continuation of the trace immediately prior to the undefined behavior satisfies π T .
• The source-to-target mappingτ states that by compiling a program satisfying a property π S we obtain a program that produces traces that satisfy the same property or that extend a source trace that ends in undefined behavior. These definitions can help us reason about programs. For instance,σ specifies that, to prove that an event does not happen in the target, it is not enough to prove that it does not happen in the source: it is also necessary to prove that the source program is safe, i.e. it does not have any undefined behavior (second disjunct). Indeed, if it had an undefined behavior, one of its continuation would exhibit the unwanted event, and so would not be in the property. Theτ map clarifies that if undefined behavior can happen in the source, nothing can be said about target traces after that point: the undefined behavior could indeed be replaced by anything (second disjunct).
Example 3.2 (Going to machine code). We now consider a more realistic setting, in which we reached a low-level language like machine code, whose semantics is often fully defined. On the one hand, the target traces can no longer exhibit undefined behavior. On the other hand, the target traces can also contain new events that cannot occur in the source: indeed, modern architecture like x86 often have a lot more instructions that what a compiler uses. Some of them might even perform dangerous operations, such as writing to the hard drive. Formally, the source and target do not have the same events anymore. We consider a source alphabet Σ S = Σ ∪ {Goes_wrong}, and a target alphabet Σ T = Σ ∪ Σ ′ , with no undefined behavior in Σ ′ .
The trace relation is defined in the same way and we obtain the same property mappings as above, except that since target traces now have more events, some of which dangerous, the fact that the target traces continue in arbitrary ways gets more interesting. For instance, consider a new event that represents writing data on the hard drive, and suppose we want to prove that this event cannot happen for their compiled program. If the source program cannot exhibit undefined behavior, then the target property trivially holds, by the first disjunct ofσ . Otherwise, by the same reasoning as in Example 3.1 above, there is no way of proving that the bad event doesn't happen. More generally, the mappings confirm that there is little hope of proving non-trivial properties involving new target events, using source-level reasoning. Indeed, what one can prove about target-only events can only be that either they cannot appear, because there is no undefined behavior, or that any of them can appear, in case of an undefined behavior.
Resource Exhaustion
In this section, we return to the discussion about resource exhaustion from the introduction. Resource exhaustion captures the fact that low-level target languages are often subject to hardware or software restrictions that may halt the execution earlier: for instance, this could occur when no more memory could be allocated, when encountering a stack overflow, or when running out of gas in a smart contract. These restrictions are often not considered in the source language. For instance, the verified CakeML compiler [50] uses an abstract ML-like source language, that is compiled all the way down to assembly. In the lower levels, memory usage is restricted. This is captured by their compiler correctness theorem in the following manner:
Any binary produced by a successful evaluation of the compiler function will either:
• behave exactly according to the observable behavior of the source semantics, or • behave the same as the source up to some point at which it terminates with an out-of-memory error.
Example 3.3 (Resource Exhaustion). We consider traces made of events drawn from Σ S in the source, and Σ T = Σ S ∪ {Resource_Limit_Hit}. We recall the trace relation for resource exhaustion:
Formally, this relation is similar to the one for undefined behavior, except this time it is the target trace that is allowed to end early, instead of the source trace. By manipulating the definitions, we can see that the induced trace property mappingsσ andτ are equal to the following ( , file ResourceExhaustion.v):
These capture the following intuitions:
• The target-to-source mappingσ states that to prove a property of the compiled program, one has to prove that the source program's traces satisfy two conditions: (1) they must also satisfy the target property, and (2) each of their prefixes immediately followed by a resource exhaustion error must satisfy the target property.
• The other mappingτ states that a compiled program can guarantee the same properties as the source program, except that all traces must be allowed to end early due to resource exhaustion.
Note thatσ is restrictive: any property that prevents resource exhaustion cannot be proved using source-level reasoning. Indeed, if π T does not allow resource exhaustion, thenσ (π T ) = ∅. This was to be expected because resource exhaustion is simply not accounted for at the source level.
In this model, we also proved that safety properties are mapped (in the two directions) to other safety properties ( , file ResourceExhaustion.v). In particular, this means that to obtain some target safety properties one only has to do source reasoning about safety properties.
CakeML's compiler correctness theorem is an example of CC ∼ for the ∼ relation above. We also implemented two small compilers that are correct for this relation, as other examples of cases where this relation is needed. For space reasons, the full details can be found in the Coq development in the supplementary materials ( , file ResourceExhaustionExample.v for the first example, and folder ResourceExhaustion/ for the second example).
The first compiler goes from a simple expression language, similar to the one of §3.3, but without inputs, to the same language, but where the execution is fuel bounded: each execution step consumes some fuel, and the execution immediately halts when it is exhausted. The compiler is identity.
More interestingly, we also proved this CC ∼ instance for a variant of Xavier Leroy's DSSS'17 compiler from a while language to a simple stack-machine [27] , assuming the determinism of the stack machine. We enriched the two languages with outputs, and we modified the semantics of the stack-machine so that it gets into an error state if the stack reaches a certain size.
We extended the compiler to handle outputs and proved it attains our CC ∼ instance. The proof uses a canonical forward simulation modified to allow failing: If the source execution takes a step from a configuration to another configuration emitting some event (that can be a silent event), then there are two possibilities for a related target configuration: either (i) it can take some steps to another configuration related to the second source configuration and emit the same event (as in a standard simulation), or (ii) it can take some steps to an error state, not emitting any event. This then corresponds to the case of a resource exhaustion error: the target execution can terminate early, only producing a prefix of the source execution trace, as allowed by the relation.
Different Source and Target Values
In this section, we illustrate trace-relating compilation by considering a compiler that compiles source-level booleans into target-level natural numbers. The source language is a simple staticallytyped expression language, described below. Expressions e are either naturals n, booleans b, conditionals, arithmetic expressions, relational expressions, boolean inputs in b or natural inputs in n . A trace s is a list of inputs is paired with a result r. Types ty are either N (naturals) or B (booleans), and typing is defined as follows: 
The source language has a big-step operational semantics defined as follows (error rules omitted): The target is untyped and only has naturals. The source-level ≤ operator is replaced by a fourargument if statement whose condition is that the first argument is less than the second. e ::= n | e op e | if e ≤ e then e else e | in n op ::= + | × r ::= n i ::= n is ::= i · is | ∅ t ::= ⟨is, r⟩
The semantics of the target language is given in big-step style. Since we only have naturals and all expressions operate on them, no error result is possible. Rules Sem-nat, Sem-in-nat and Sem-op-nat are the same as for the source language and we present the new rules only:
(Sem-itele-true)
if e 1 ≤ e 2 then e 3 else e 4 ⇝ ⇝ ⇝ ⟨is 1 · is 2 · is 4 n 4 ⟩
The compiler takes source expressions and emits target expressions as follows: n↓ = n true↓ = 1 e 1 + e 2 ↓ = e 1 ↓+ e 2 ↓ in n ↓ = in n false↓ = 0 e 1 ≤ e 2 ↓ = if e 1 ↓ ≤ e 2 ↓ then 1 else 0 in b ↓ = in n e 1 × e 2 ↓ = e 1 ↓× e 2 ↓ if e 1 then e 2 else e 3 ↓ = if e 1 ↓ ≤ 0 then e 3 ↓ else e 2 ↓
The interesting case is compiling the if-then-else statement, where the boolean condition is transformed into a comparison against 0 (and the branches are swapped accordingly).
Defining the Trace Relation. We first relate basic values (naturals and booleans) as follows:
We then extend the relation to lists of inputs in a pointwise fashion (Rules Empty and Cons) and lift that relation to traces (Rules Nat and Bool).
is ∼ is n ∼ n ⟨is, n⟩ ∼ ⟨is, n⟩
is ∼ is b ∼ n ⟨is, b⟩ ∼ ⟨is, n⟩
Compiler correctness. The compiler is proven correct in the sense of CC ∼ . A difficulty in the trace-relating compilation setting is that the proof of Theorem 3.4 does not follow from determinacy, input totality, and forward simulation, as is the case for compilation chains that have the same set of traces at both source and target level [26] . Instead, because the trace relation is not injective (e.g., both 0 and false are mapped to 0 in the target), the type system is used to disambiguate between the two possibilities to backtranslate a target trace. The property mappingsσ andτ induced by the trace relation ∼ defined above capture the intuition behind encoding booleans as naturals:
• the source-to-target mapping allows for true to be encoded by any non-zero natural number;
• the target-to-source mapping requires, for example, that 0 is replaceable by both 0 and false.
A possible extension to the property mappings is to take into account the type of the source program and obtain a type-aware property mapping. That is, in order to study the source obligation for source programs e of type ty, one can instead consider the following restriction:σ ty (π T ) = σ (π T ) ∩ {s | ∃e ′ : ty. e ′ ⇝ ⇝ ⇝s}. This strengthens the proof obligation by restricting it to traces that can be produced by programs of a fixed type. Reasoning using this proof obligation is indeed correct, because when σ is used in TP σ , it is always restricted to source traces produced by a program of the appropriate type. This narrowing of the source obligation can be used to guide verification: indeed, ifσ states that one has to prove that the result is either 0 or false, thenσ ty tells us which disjunct to prove: if the source programs we are interested in have type N then 0, else false.
IO Abstraction Mismatches
We now consider how to relate traces where a single source action is compiled to multiple target ones. To illustrate this, we use a source language that can output compound values of arbitrary size, and a target language where sent values have a fixed size. Concretely, the source has actions such as send ⟨v1, ⟨v2, v3⟩⟩, which is compiled into a sequence of sends send v1 ; send v2 ; send v3.
The Source Language N p . N p is a statically-typed language with expressions, commands and simple types (natural numbers and pairs) whose syntax is presented below. The key aspect of N p is the primitive for sending pairs over a network interface. The type system of N p is unsurprising. 
⊢ e : τ × τ ′ ⊢ e.2 : τ ′ N p has a contextual, small-step, call by value semantics for expressions (e → e ′ ) and a big-step semantics for commands (c s − − → c ′ ) that produces traces s, i.e. sequences of messages M (i.e. pairs ⟨v, v⟩) sent over the network. In the following, queuing the empty element is ineffective: s = ϵ · s. The Target Language N n . N n is a statically-typed language with the same types as N p , but its primitive for sending over a network interface only sends natural numbers. Nothing changes regarding statements, terms, values, types and evaluation contexts between N n and N p . There is only one typing rule that changes compared to N p , the one for send n. N n has the same dynamic semantics as N p , the only changes regard the nature of messages and the reduction of send n.
The Compiler from N p to N n : (·)↓. The compiler from N p to N n is defined inductively on the type derivation of a source statement ( ·↓ : ⊢ c → c) which, in turn, relies on compilation of expressions ( ·↓ : ⊢ e : τ → e). The only interesting case is when compiling a send e, where we use the source type information concerning the message (i.e. a pair) being sent to deconstruct that pair into a sequence of natural numbers, which is what is sent in the target.
The compiler operates on type derivations for terms. Thus, compiling c; c ′ would look like the following (using D as a metavariable to range over derivations).
However, note that each judgment uniquely identifies which typing rule is being applied and the underlying derivation. Thus, for compactness, we only write the judgment in the compilation and implicitly apply the related typing rule to obtain the underlying judgments for recursive calls.
⊢ ifz e then c else c
The gensend (·) function takes a source expression and returns a sequence of target send instructions that send each element of the expression. Formally: gensend (·) : ⊢ e : τ → c
Relating Traces. We start with the trivial relation between numbers: n ∼ 0 n, i.e. numbers are related when they are the same number. We cannot build a relation between single messages since a single source message is related to multiple target ones. However we can build a relation between a source message and a target trace: M ∼ t, defined inductively on the structure of M.
A pair of naturals is related to the two messages that send each element of the pair (Rule TraceRel-N-N). Otherwise, if we split a pair into sub-pairs, we request all such sub-pairs to be related (Rules Trace-Rel-N-M to Trace-Rel-M-M).
With this we can define the trace relation between source and target traces: s ∼ t.
(Trace-Rel-Single)
∅ ∼ ∅ Trivially, traces are related when they are both empty (Rule Trace-Rel-Empty). Alternatively, given related trace, we can concatenate a source message and a second target trace provided that they are related (Rule Trace-Rel-Single). This relation induces the standard mappings between source and target properties,τ andσ (Definition 2.5).
To prove that the compiler is correct (Theorem 3.7) we need two auxiliary results. Lemma 3.5 tells us that the way we break down a source send into multiple target ones is correct. Lemma 3.6 tells us that the compilation of expressions is correct. For brevity, proofs are omitted and can be found in the appendix. 
Lemma 3.6 ( (·)↓ is correct for expressions). if (⊢
With our trace relation, the trace property mappings capture the following intuitions:
• The target-to-source mapping states that a source property can reconstruct target messages as it sees fit. For example, trace 4 · 6 · 5 · 7 is related to ⟨4, 6⟩ · ⟨5, 7⟩ and ⟨⟨4, ⟨6, ⟨5, 7⟩⟩⟩⟩ (and many more variations). This gives freedom to the source implementation of a specific target behavior, which is a result of the non-injectivity of ∼. 4 • The source-to-target mapping states that the only valid target traces are those that source programs can compute, without any addition. This intuitively seems to preserve the meaning of the property, mapping source safety properties to target safety properties and even source hyperproperties to target hyperproperties.
Low-Level Observations and Abstract Noninterference
To conclude this example tour of trace-relating compilation, we explore a scenario in which target observations are more precise than the source ones by including the consumption of some physical resource-here, time-and consider the impact on a subset-closed hyperproperty, noninterference. Recall from §2.5 that, when using CC ∼ to reason about the preservation of subset-closed hyperproperties, the loss of precision introduced by the subset closure of the lifted hyperproperty after mapping can be problematic. In particular, below we show that for the considered compilation chain, noninterference is not preserved. However, all is not lost: a weaker form of noninterference is preserved, and can be precisely described using the parameterized framework of abstract noninterference [12] . Furthermore, given this general framework, we can even systematically determine the precise notion of noninterference that a compiled program satisfies, given any notion of interference that the source program satisfies.
To illustrate the problem of preserving noninterference through compilation, let Trace S denote the set of traces in the source, and Trace T = Trace S × N ω , where N ω ≜ N ∪ {ω} be the set of target traces. The associated natural number in a target trace denotes the time spent in producing the trace (ω if infinite). We define the trace relation as follows:
A trace produced by some target program is related to the source trace when it simply forgets the time spent in the computation. Therefore, a compiler is CC ∼ if whenever a trace is exhibited at the target level, the same can be simulated, no matter in how much time, in the source. 
In the context of our trace-relating compiler, the source notion of noninterference, NI S , differs from the target notion of noninterference, NI T , because more precise observations are possible in the target: i.e. comparing time. To understand formally why noninterference is not preserved, consider a source program W that satisfies source noninterference NI S . Then W↓ satisfies NI T only if executions of W↓ that produce the same trace of events do not take different time: NI T = {π S × {n} | π S ∈ NI S ∧ n ∈ N ω }. Because noninterference is a subset-closed hyperproperty ( §2.5), attaining CC ∼ only ensures that W↓ satisfies Cl ⊆ •τ (NI S ), which is equal to {π S × I | π S ∈ NI S ∧ I ⊆ N ω }, and hence strictly weaker than NI T .
Intuitively, the only guarantee we get out of CC ∼ here is that every target adversary that is not able to measure the time W↓ takes for its computations, cannot notice any interference. Therefore, some form of noninterference is preserved, if we are willing to declassify time.
Abstract noninterference. To formally capture the weaker notion of noninterference that is preserved by CC ∼ we appeal to the concept of abstract noninterference [12] . Roughly speaking, the observational power of the attacker can be weakened by choosing more liberal relations than low , and some declassification can be allowed by checking low equivalence only on some of the inputs, i.e. by choosing a more restrictive low I . Abstract noninterference ANI ρ ϕ is a parameterized notion of noninterference, where ρ is an explicit characterization of a harmless attacker, and ϕ denotes the permitted declassification.
Formally, ϕ and ρ are required to be upper-closed operators (i.e. monotonic, idempotent and extensive). 5 The set of upper-closed operators on a poset (X , ≤) is denoted by uco(X ), though here we are only interested in posets of the form (2 X , ⊆) for some set X . Hereafter, for x ∈ X , we simply write f (x) for f ({x }).
Definition 3.9 (Abstract Noninterference [12] ). Let ϕ, ρ ∈ uco(2 Trace ) Trace-Relating Compilation and ANI. We can now formally express that if a source program W satisfies NI S , then W↓ satisfies an instance of abstract noninterference, specifically ANI ρ ϕ where:
It is straightforward to show ANI ρ ϕ = Cl ⊆ •τ (NI S ). Therefore, in this setting, we know that a
. This is helpful because ρ defines what target information must be hidden or protected, and ϕ defines for which inputs the policy must hold. In this specific setting, as intuitively expected, execution time must be hidden, and the policy still must hold on the same inputs considered in the source.
Compiling ANI. Beyond using ANI for a specific compilation example, we can formulate in a general way how a CC ∼ compiler preserves an arbitrary notion of interference in the source, as long as it is expressed as an instance of ANI. Theorem 3.10 shows that it is always possible to preserve some notion of noninterference, whenever source traces are an abstraction of target ones (i.e. when ∼ is a total and surjective map).
Theorem 3.10 (Compiling ANI). Assume traces of source and target languages are related via ∼⊆ Trace S × Trace T and that ∼ is a total, surjective map from target to source traces. Assume ↓ is a CC ∼ compiler, and ϕ, ρ ∈ uco(2 Trace S ).
ϕ # where ϕ # and ρ # are defined as follows:
A consequence of Theorem 3.10 is that whenever we allow for new observations on noninterfering programs, a weaker notion of noninterference is still guaranteed to be satisfied. The identity compiler is indeed CC ∼ for the relation ∼ that "forgets" about the extra target observations.
PRESERVING OTHER (HYPER)PROPERTY CLASSES
In this section we investigate how to preserve two classes of (hyper)properties beyond trace properties: safety properties ( §4.1) and arbitrary hyperproperties that are not just subset-closed ( §4.2). For each of these classes, we start by giving an intuition of what it means to preserve such a class in the equal-trace setting, then we study preservation of that class in the trace-relating setting.
Preserving Safety Properties
Safety collects all trace properties prescribing that "something bad never happens" , so that their violation can be monitored and, when observed, no longer restored [9] . To define this class we will assume traces are similar to the CompCert ones, i.e. lists or streams of events, so that we can easily talk about finite prefixes m of a trace t, written m ≤ t.
Definition 4.1 (Safety Properties). A property π is
A proof of the preservation of all trace properties, i.e. of CC = , may require to show that a source program can produce an infinite stream of events. For safety properties one is required to only to show the following weaker variant of CC = ,
where W ⇝ ⇝ ⇝ m means producing m, i.e. a finite prefix of a trace produced by W (formally:
Recalling the intention of safety properties to prescribe "something bad never happens" , W ⇝ * m can be interpreted as a violation of a safety property, the one stating "the finite list of events m is never observed" . The statement of SC = can therefore be read as "whenever W↓ violates a safety property, then W does". By contraposition it has been shown that this is equivalent to the preservation of arbitrary safety properties [2] :
In the trace-relating setting, we generalize SC = by requiring that whenever W↓ violates a target safety property π T ∈ Safety T , then W violates its source interpretation,σ (π T ). 
Again we propose two generalizations of the preservation of safety properties that are equivalent to SC ∼ . The only detail to take care of is thatτ (π S ) for π S ∈ Safety S is not necessarily in Safety T , so
that similarly to what we did in §2.5, we have to closeτ (π S ) in the class of target safety properties. 6 Theorem 4.3 (Trinitarian view for Safety). Given a trace relation ∼⊆ Trace S × Trace T , and its induced property mappingsσandτ , SC ∼ is equivalent to the following two criteria:
where Safe(π T ) = {S T | S T ∈ Safety T ∧ π T ⊆ S T } is the smallest target safety property that contains π T .
Notice that in TP Safe•τ we quantify over arbitrary source properties, but the guarantee we get in the target is given by approximating the guarantee defined byτ , with a safety property. This second approximation is optimal by minimality of Safe, and is necessary asτ may not map safety properties to safety properties (in this case, no comparison with SC ∼ would be possible). . 
Preserving Non-Subset Closed Hyperproperties
Hyperproperties can be used to provide an exact specification for a program W. For a trace property π , by W |= {π } we mean that the traces W can emit are all and only those that satisfy π . This is a much stronger requirement than W |= π , since the latter prescribes that only traces in π can be observed when running W, but not necessarily all of them. It is therefore interesting to study the satisfaction and the preservation of arbitrary, in particular non-subset-closed, hyperproperties. CC = is not enough to guarantee the preservation of the hyperproperty just mentioned ({π })
as it only ensures refinement of the behaviors through compilation but not the other inclusion, sometimes referred to as reflection. It is well known that the following strengthening of CC = is equivalent to the preservation of arbitrary hyperproperties.
Theorem 4.4 (HC = , HP). For every compilation chain ↓, the followings are equivalent
The generalization to the trace-relating setting, HC ∼ ≡ ∀W. beh( W↓) =τ (beh(W)), does not come with two equivalent formulations in terms of preservation of hyperproperties. While for HPτ the equivalence holds unconditionally, for HPσ we do not provide a full characterization but only an implication under some extra assumptions. It is still possible, and correct, to deduce a source obligation for a given target hyperproperty H T but we require that in the compositionτ •σ no information is lost (i.e. we do not just have a Galois connection, but a Galois insertion).
Theorem 4.5 (Weak Trinity). Given a trace relation ∼⊆ Trace S × Trace T , and its induced property mappingsσandτ , HC ∼ is equivalent to HPτ below. Moreover ifτ ⇆σ is a Galois insertion (i.e. τ •σ = id), HC ∼ implies HPσ below. We sum up the proposed generalizations, and order them according their strength in Figure 2 . 
HPτ HPσ
CC ∼ TPτ TPσ SCHP Cl ⊆ •τ SCHP Cl ⊆ •σ HC ∼

TRACE-RELATING SECURE COMPILATION
So far we studied compiler correctness criteria parameterized by a relation between source and target traces. However, in practice, programs are not used on their own, but they live in a context where they can interact with other programs, libraries, etc. This context is out-of-control of the user; in most cases, it can not be assumed that everything the compiled program will interact with is benign and thus it can behave maliciously and try to disrupt the compiled program. Hence, in this section we consider the following secure compilation scenario: a source program is compiled, and linked with an arbitrary target-level context, i.e. one that may not be the compilation of a source context. Compiler correctness does not address this case, as it never considers arbitrary target contexts. In fact compiler correctness considers either no target context (whole programs) or so-called well-behaved target contexts (compositional compiler correctness), i.e. target contexts that behave like source ones.
To account for this scenario, Abate et al. [2] describe a class of secure compilation criteria based on the preservation of classes of properties against arbitrary target context. For each of these criteria, they give an equivalent "property-free" criterion, in the same manner as the duality between TP and CC. For instance, their robust trace properties preservation criterion (RTP) states that for any property π , if program P plugged into any context C satisfies the property, then the compiled program P↓ plugged into any target context C satisfies the (same) property. Their equivalent criterion to RTP is RTC, which states that for any trace produced by the compiled program when linked with any target context, there is a source context that produces the same trace. Formally (writing C [P] to mean program P linked with context C) they define:
Abate et al. [2] propose many more equivalent pairs of criteria, each one preserving different classes of (hyper)properties we discussed earlier: properties, safety properties, hypersafety properties, subset-closed hyperproperties, hyperproperties and more. However, all these criteria are stated in a setting where source and target traces are the same. In this section, we scale their result to the trace-relating setting, obtaining the same trinitarian view of secure compilation as for compiler correctness ( §5.1). Then, we provide examples that our trinitarian view of secure compilation criteria can be instantiated for properties ( §5.2), safety properties ( §5.3) and hypersafety properties ( §5.4). Interestingly, the last two such examples are adaptations of existing results from the secure compilation literature.
Trace-Relating Secure Compilation: A Spectrum of Trinities
The generalization of the hierarchy proposed in [2] builds on top of the ideas from Section 2. Most of the definitions and theorems presented depend only on source and target traces, (hyper)properties or specific classes of these. In particular it is always possible to define a Galois connection between properties, once a trace relation is given (Definition 2.5), so that the generalization of RTC to the trace-relating setting (Definition 5.1) can be shown equivalent to the two expected criteria about preservation of robust satisfaction (Theorem 5.2). 
RTPσ RTPτ
Proof. ( ) Theorems rel_RTC_τ RTP and rel_RTC_σ RTP in RobustTraceCriterion.v. □
Due to spaces constraints, we do not list all the definitions for the criteria for all possible subclasses. Instead, we provide an illustrative diagram of the criteria from [2] that are brought to the trace-relating setting ( Figure 3 ) and describe a way to navigate it. The diagram indicates with a the trinities whose equivalences have been proven in Coq. The interested reader will find omitted definitions in the anonymous supplementary materials. For a given trace relation ∼, the diagram orders the generalized criteria according to their relative strength (higher is stronger); if a trinity implies another, then the former is stronger. Moreover, it shows that for all of them a trinitarian view is possible. Every point in the diagram has one of the two following shapes: R _ P (·) or R _ C ∼ . In either case the common hole (_) is filled with an acronym of some class of (hyper)properties or relational (hyper)properties. We adopt the acronyms of Abate et al. [2] , so H means "hyperproperties", SCH means "subset-closed hyperproperties", HS means "hypersafety properties", TP means "trace properties" and S means "safety properties". The second hole of R _ P (·) is filled with an operator that can be one ofτ andσ . In certain cases, as explained in §4.1 for the case of compiler correctness, this operator is closed in a way that ensures the final image will be in the considered class of (relational)(hyper)properties. As seen before, closing with Safe (i.e. Safe •τ (π S )) is a safety property for arbitrary π S .
As previously mentioned, this closing is needed because certain property-free criteria do not follow from their their property-full one but from a stronger one that is closed under a certain class of properties. This is the case for RSCτ , which instead is derived from closing RTC with safety properties, i.e. RTC Safe•τ (as was happening in Theorem 4.3). To facilitate reading the diagram, we color-code the trinity from which the stronger criterion is borrowed in order to realize that a criterion is not derived from the current trinity but from a different one (with the same background color). Specifically, the trace-based trinity is blue, the subset-closed hyperproperty one is red, and 2-relational trace properties are green.
We now turn to examples that instantiate these criteria.
Trace-Relating Robust Preservation of Trace Properties
This section explores trace-relating secure compilation by extending the setting of §3.3 to a target language having strictly more events than the source.
Source and Target Languages. The source and target languages used in this section (R S and R T , respectively) are nearly identical expression languages borrowing from the syntax of the source language of §3.3. Both languages add sequencing of expressions (which discards the result of evaluating the first sub-expression), two kinds of output events, and the expressions that generate them: out L n and out L n (usable respectively in R S and R T ) and out H n (usable only in R T ). The presence of out H events is the sole difference between source and target. 7 The extra events in the target model the fact that the target language has more leeway to observe values during the execution of the program than the source language has; in a sense, the target level could leak information that may otherwise be protected from observation at the source.
Both languages and compilation chains now deal with partial programs, contexts and linking of those to produce whole programs. In this setting, a whole program is the combination of a main expression to be evaluated and a set of function definitions (with distinct names) that can refer to their argument symbolically and can be called by the main expression and by other functions. The set of functions of a whole program comes from a partial program and a context; the latter also contains the main expression. The extensions of the typing rules and the operational semantics for whole programs are unsurprising and therefore elided. The trace model also follows closely that of §3.3: it consists of a list of regular events (including the new outputs) terminated by a result event. Finally, a partial program and a context can be combined into a whole program when their functions satisfy the requirements mentioned above.
The target language R T is a small extension of the source, which allows target-only events to appear in expressions and consequently in traces.
e ::= · · · | e 1 ; e 2 | f(e) | out L n | arg fs ::= ⟨f 1 , e 1 ⟩ , . . . , ⟨f n , e n ⟩ e ::= · · · | out H n P ::= ⟨fs, e⟩ C ::= fs W ::
Relating Traces. In the present model, source and target traces differ only in the fact that the target draws (regular) events from a strictly larger set than the source, i.e. Σ T ⊃ Σ S . A natural relation between source and target traces essentially maps to a given target trace t the source trace that erases from t those events that exist only at the target level. Let t| Σ S indicate that elements in trace t are filtered to be only those that appear in alphabet Σ S . We define the trace relation as:
In the opposite direction, a source trace s is related to many target traces, as a finite number of target-only events can be inserted at any point in s. The induced mappings for this relation are:
That is, the target guarantee of a source property is that the target has the same source-level behavior, sprinkled with arbitrary target-level behavior. Conversely, the source-level obligation of a target property is the aggregate of those source traces all of whose target-level enrichments are in the target property.
Proof of Secure Compilation. Since R S and R T are very similar, we do not need advanced proof techniques to prove that the identity compiler from R S to R T is secure. Let us denote with ·↓ that compiler; for the trace relation ∼ defined above, Theorem 5.3 holds. This instantiation is simple since the trace relation is a function from target traces to source traces, and it is easy to clean target contexts to produce equivalent source context without target-only events. The proof is a trivial instance of precise, context-based backtranslation [2, 34, 40, 48] , aided by a few straightforward lemmas and where the case of function calls is guaranteed to terminate by the language. □
Trace-Relating Robust Preservation of Safety Properties
I/O events are not the only instance of events that compilers consider. Especially in the setting of secure compilation, where a compartmentalized partial program interacts with a context, interaction traces are often used [2, 20, 35, 37] . Consider a language analogous to that of the previous section, where the context C defines a set of functions F c and the program defines a different set F p . Interaction traces (generally) record the control flow of calls between these two sets via actions that are call f v and ret v [19] . These actions indicate a call to function f with parameter v and a return with return value v. In case the context calls a function in F p (or returns to a function in F p ), the action is decorated with a ? (i.e. those actions are call f v? and ret v?). Dually, the program calling a function in F c (or returning to it) generates an action decorated with a ! (i.e. those actions are call f v! and ret v!). Patrignani and Garg [37] consider precisely such a setting. Moreover, they define a compiler that preserves safety properties of source programs (i.e. it is RSC in the sense of Figure 3 ) by relying on capability machines. The interesting point, however, is that they also consider source and target traces to be distinct since the source has bools and nats and the target only has nats. 8 Thus, to prove RSC, they rely on a cross-language relation on values, which is scaled to trace actions, and then scaled point-wise to traces (analogously to what we have done in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 5.2).
Besides defining a relation on traces (which is an instance of ∼), they also define a relation between source and target safety properties that supports concurrent programs. 9 Thus, they really provide an instantiation of τ that maps all safe source traces to the related target ones. This ensures that no additional target trace is introduced in the target safety property, and thus the meaning of the source safety property is preserved by τ .
Their compiler is then proven to generate code that respects τ , so they achieve a variation of RSC τ . Their proofs are based on standard techniques either for secure compilation (i.e. trace-based backtranslation [40] ) and for correct compilation (i.e. forward/backward simulation [26] ). This indicates how the theory developed here can already be instantiated to encompass existing results, and that existing proof techniques can be used in order to achieve the secure compilation criteria we define.
Trace-Relating Robust Preservation of Hypersafety Properties
Patrignani and Garg [36] study the preservation of hypersafety from the perspective of secure compilation. Again, their result can be interpreted in our setting. They consider reactive systems, where trace alphabets are partitioned in input actions α? and output actions α!, whose concatenation generate traces α?α!. We use the same notation as before and indicate such sequences as s and t respectively. The set of target output actions α ! includes an action √ that has no source counterpart (i.e. ∄α? ∼ √ ), and whose output does not depend on internal state (thus it cannot leak secrets). 10 
By emitting
√ whenever undesired inputs are fed to a compiled program (e.g., passing a nat when a bool is expected), hypersafety is preserved (as √ does not leak secrets) [36] . More formally, they assume a relation on actions ∼ that is total on the source actions and injective. From there, they define TPC-which here corresponds to an instance of τ -that maps the set of valid source traces to the set of valid target traces (that now mention √ ) as follows:
where undesired (α ?) indicates that α ? is an undesired input (intuitively, this is an information that can be derived from the set of source traces [36] ). Informally, given a set of source traces π S , TPC generates all target traces that are related (pointwise) to a source trace (case int 0 ). Then (case int n+1 ), it adds all traces (t) with interleavings of undesired input α ? (point iii) followed by √ (point i) as long as the interleavings split a trace t 1 t 2 that has already been mapped (point ii).
TPC is an instance of τ that preserves hypersafety (and therefore, safety), thus our theory can be instantiated for the preservation of these classes of hyperproperties as well.
RELATED WORK
Throughout this paper we already discussed how our results relate to existing work in correct compilation [25, 50] and secure compilation [2, 36, 37] , so here we focus on other related work.
Compilers where our work could be useful. Wang et al. [53] recently proposed a CompCert variant that compiles all the way to machine code, and it would be interesting to see if the more realistic 9 They call those safety properties monitors since they focus on safety [46] and indicate s with M and t with M. 10 Technically, they assume a set of √ actions, but for this analogy a single action suffices. an ML language to assembly using a cross-language logical relation to state their CC theorem. Unfortunately, they do not have traces, though were one to add them, the logical relation on values would serve as the basis for the trace relation and therefore their result would attain CC ∼ . Some secure compilation results do not rely on traces for their security criterion (instead proving compiler full abstraction [1, 40] ) but they rely on target-level traces as a proof technique [3, 18, 20, 38, 39] . Most of these results consider a cross-language relation that could be lifted to source traces (were they added), so they can be proved to attain one of the criteria from Figure 3 . Other secure compilation results rely on traces for their security criterion, but they are the same between source and target language [2] . Since they attain a variation of robustly-safe compilation (RSC in Figure 3 ), we can see their compiler as an instance of RSC = .
Generalizations of compiler correctness. The compiler correctness definition of Morris [31] was already general enough to account for trace relations, since it considered a translation between the semantics of the source program and that of the compiled program, which he called "decode" in his diagram, reproduced in Figure 4 (left). And even some of the more recent compiler correctness definitions preserve this kind of flexibility [41] . Still, while CC ∼ can be seen as an instance of Morris' [31] definition, we are not aware of any prior work that also looks at how properties are preserved when the "decode translation" is not identity. Correct compilation and Galois connections. Melton et al. [29] and Sabry and Wadler [45] expressed a strong variant of compiler correctness using the diagram of Figure 4 (right) [29, 45] , which is almost the same as Morris' [31] . Intuitively a correct compiler should map source programs to target ones that parallel the computation steps of the original source programs. More precisely to prove compiler correctness one has to show the existence of a decompilation map #, that makes the diagram commute. This problem reduces to showing that the compilation map ↓ is the lower adjoint of a Galois insertion [29] . Compilation and decompilation maps are thought to be maps between the sets of terms in the two languages ordered according to the operational semantics. We write W ≤ W ′ ⇐⇒ W ↠ W ′ , where ↠ is the reflexive, transitive closure of the operational semantics of the language. In case ↓ is the lower adjoint of a Galois connection, it is possible to define a map on trace properties τ : 2 Trace S → 2 Trace T such that TP τ holds. Such a τ will be the lower adjoint of a Galois connection as well. It follows that σ : 2 Trace T → 2 Trace S , the upper adjoint of τ is uniquely defined, as well as a relation ∼ ⊆ Trace S × Trace T so that both TP σ and TC ∼ hold. We show this when traces are single values (the results of the computation or ⊥ if the computation diverges) (Appendix A.1)and when traces are lists or infinite streams of program states (Appendix A.2).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We extended the property preservation view on compiler correctness to arbitrary trace relations, and hope that this view will be useful for understanding the guarantees various compilers provide. An open question is whether given a compiler there is always a best ∼ relation for which this compiler is correct. As we mentioned in the introduction, every compiler is CC ∼ for some ∼, but is there always an optimal one? Finally, another interesting direction for future work is studying whether using the relation to Galois connections allows us to more easily compose trace relations for different concerns, say for a compiler that has undefined behavior, resource exhaustion, and side-channels. Observe that Figure 4 does not explicitly provide a proof obligation for W, ensuring that W↓ satisfies some property π T . Such an obligation is instead given by the upper adjoint of τ , σ = λ π T ∈ 2 Trace T . {v S | ∀v T . v S ↓↠v T ⇒ v T ∈ π T }
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A.2 Traces as sequences of states
In this section program computations are modeled as sets of finite or infinite sequences of states. Let Σ be the set of possible states of programs, denote by (Σ * + •) ∪ Σ ω finite sequences of states terminating with a final/blocking state, together with the infinite ones [10] . The set of all traces is the subset of (Σ * + •) ∪ Σ ω of sequences that are possible according to the operational semantics, we write t ∈ Trace ⇐⇒ ∃W . To show TC ∼ follows from Figure 4 we distinguish two cases. If t is finite then we proceed by induction on its length. If t is infinite we use a coinductive argument. Roughly speaking, for each state k of the target trace, we know by hypothesis that W k ↠ ( W↓ k ) # . This reduction happens in finitely many steps, hence encountering finitely many states that we append to the partial source trace given at step k − 1.
B PROOFS FOR Section 3.4
Proof for Lemma 3.5 (gensend (·) works). We proceed by induction on τ and τ ′ : τ = N and τ ′ = N By canonicity we have that e = ⟨n, n ′ ⟩ gensend (·) translates that into send (⊢ ⟨n, n ′ ⟩ .1 : N)↓; send (⊢ ⟨n, n ′ ⟩ .2 : N)↓. By the target expression semantics and Rule Eval-N n -Send, that produces t = n; n ′ . We need to prove that • e ≡ ⟨n, n ′ ⟩ → * ⟨n, n; ⟩ which is trivially true;
• ⟨n, n ′ ⟩ ∼ n; n ′ , which holds by Rule Trace-Rel-N-N. 
